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NOTE
A POST-SPOKEO TAXONOMY OF INTANGIBLE HARMS
Jackson Erpenbach*
Article III standing is a central requirement in federal litigation . The Su-
preme Court’s Spokeo decision marked a significant development in the doc-
trine, dividing the concrete injury-in-fact requirement into two subsets:
tangible and intangible harms . While tangible harms are easily cognizable,
plaintiffs alleging intangible harms can face a perilous path to court . This
raises particular concern for the system of federal consumer protection laws
where enforcement relies on consumers vindicating their own rights by filing
suit when companies violate federal law . These plaintiffs must often allege in-
tangible harms arising out of their statutorily guaranteed rights . This Note
demonstrates that Spokeo’s standard for what constitutes a cognizable in-
tangible harm has produced inconsistent and arbitrary results in such lower
court cases . Courts have come to varying conclusions about which intangible
harms are sufficiently concrete to confer standing under the Court’s new
standard . This Note makes two contributions . First, it offers a novel taxono-
my of these various intangible harms, sorted into five discrete categories .
Once these categories are identified, the underlying inconsistencies, both be-
tween circuits and between similar consumer protection laws, become evi-
dent . Second, it proposes an approach to intangible harms that is more
deferential to the judgment of Congress as revealed in its statutes .
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INTRODUCTION
To bring a claim in federal court, plaintiffs must satisfy the standing re-
quirement found in Article III’s “case” or “controversy” language.1 Over
time, the Court has refined standing doctrine by framing it in terms of three
neat, formalist elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.2 The
Court’s articulation of standing has provided additional clarification for par-
ties but has also raised new questions regarding the doctrine’s limits.3 Be-
cause of standing’s threshold nature, resolving these questions has
consequences for countless federal cases.4
One area of significant controversy is what constitutes a cognizable inju-
ry in fact. Without one, a plaintiff cannot file suit in federal court. In the
past, the Supreme Court has described cognizable injuries as “concrete and
particularized, . . . ‘actual or imminent, [and] not “ conjectural” or “hypo-
thetical.” ’ ”5 Until the Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc . v . Robins, lower
courts generally treated the “concrete and particularized” language as one
requirement: particularized injuries were presumed to be sufficiently con-
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2 . See infra Section I.A.
3 . See, e .g ., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988);
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301,
304 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Ar-
ticle III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992).
4 . See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“This is the threshold question in eve-
ry federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”).
5. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
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crete.6 But in Spokeo, the Court made clear that concreteness is a separate,
necessary requirement for a cognizable injury in fact.7
Yet Spokeo only further confused standing doctrine. The Court held that
a plaintiff raising a statutory violation under a private right of action must
have suffered some concrete injury beyond the mere violation.8 In doing so,
the Court created new distinctions in the doctrine, dividing tangible from
intangible harms, and “bare procedural violation[s]” from “risk[s] of real
harm.”9 The interplay between Spokeo and the doctrine’s constitutional na-
ture has created significant confusion in the lower courts.10 A confused ju-
risprudence could, as Justice Harlan feared, reduce “constitutional standing
to a word game played by secret rules.”11
A confused standing doctrine is especially troubling in the area of con-
sumer protection because it may prevent consumers from vindicating their
interests in a federal forum.12 The modern patchwork of federal laws can be a
powerful tool for consumer interests.13 Yet since its inception, the system has
been underfunded and underenforced.14 As a result, federal consumer pro-
tection statutes are heavily reliant upon private rights of action to police bad
behavior.15 Private right of action provisions enable consumers wronged by
fraudulent business practices to vindicate their rights by acting as their own
“private attorneys general.”16 Crucially, standing doctrine limits the reach of
6 . See 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
7 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also id . at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing
that Spokeo was the first case to explicitly “discuss the separate offices of the terms ‘concrete’
and ‘particularized.’ ”).
8 . Id . at 1549 (majority opinion).
9 . Id .
10 . See infra Parts II–III.
11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. Consumer protection laws are “intended to protect the public as a whole, not just to
provide rules for deciding private disputes.” Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privati-
zation of Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and
Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 663–64 (2008).
13 . See Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer
Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1904–05 (2013) (“The problem is not a lack of
good law: federal and state legislatures have enacted far-reaching consumer protection stat-
utes . . . .”).
14 . See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institution-
alization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 1165
(2010) (“During the Reagan administration . . . the political climate shifted and there were sev-
eral developments that severely obstructed the expansion of consumer protection law.”); Mor-
ris, supra note 13, at 1905 (“[T]hese potentially powerful bodies of consumer protection law
are woefully under-enforced.”).
15 . See Budnitz, supra note 12, at 664.
16 . See id . at 689 (“Public consumer laws are intended to protect the general consumer
population, but Congress recognized that government enforcement agencies lack the resources
to ensure satisfaction of that goal. The private attorney general provisions can go far toward
achieving that goal if other obstacles do not stand in the way.”).
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such private rights of action.17 Because standing is constitutional, it cannot
be statutorily conferred.18 How lower courts apply Spokeo, then, has enor-
mous implications for the future of consumer protection statutes.
This Note argues that lower courts have applied the Spokeo standard for
standing to certain consumer protection statutes in an overly strict and in-
consistent fashion. Part I tracks the development of Article III standing from
the original language of “cases” or “controversies” through the formulation
of its modern three-part structure in Lujan v . Defenders of Wildlife to the
Court’s decision in Spokeo. Part II introduces an active circuit split between
the Third and Ninth Circuits, which concerns standing under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), as a heuristic for subsequent discussion. Part III of-
fers a novel taxonomy of intangible harms recognized by lower courts in ap-
plying the Spokeo analysis. Finally, Part IV provides a starting point for a
more consistent standing doctrine through greater deference to congression-
al factfinding.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part briefly tracks the development of the Court’s modern standing
doctrine, culminating in Spokeo’s “concrete injury” standard. Section I.A de-
scribes standing’s constitutional roots, with an emphasis on the Court’s in-
fluential Lujan decision. Section I.B provides the background for the Court’s
2016 Spokeo decision and its focus on concreteness. Section I.C explores the
standard for intangible harms and highlights persistent ambiguities.
A. The Development of Standing Doctrine
Modern standing has its roots in Article III of the Constitution, which
restricts the judicial branch’s authority to “cases” and “controversies.”19
These terms set familiar baselines: courts preside over legal disputes between
adversarial parties that can be resolved with a decision.20
But standing as a distinct constitutional doctrine did not gain significant
force until the latter half of the twentieth century.21 Two primary justifica-
tions have shaped the doctrine. The first justification concerns separation of
17 . See, e .g ., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
18 . See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (“[T]he requirement of
injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20. William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 198 (“It
is black letter law that these terms require the case to be between the proper sorts of parties,
ones who have some legal dispute that the court can resolve.”).
21 . See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 169 (“In the history of the Supreme Court, standing
has been discussed in terms of Article III on 117 occasions. Of those . . . nearly half . . . oc-
curred after 1985 . . . . The explosion of judicial interest in standing as a distinct body of consti-
tutional law is an extraordinarily recent phenomenon.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
Others contest Sunstein’s historical claims. E .g ., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does His-
tory Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691, 712 (2004).
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powers: the case-or-controversy requirement ensures that courts retain their
traditional role as adjudicators of live disputes and are not pushed into legis-
lative or executive roles.22 The second is pragmatic: standing conserves judi-
cial resources and ensures that consequential matters are brought by moti-
motivated plaintiffs.23
Justice Scalia’s Lujan opinion “significantly shift[ed] the law of standing”
to its modern tripartite framework.24 A plaintiff must first prove that she has
suffered an injury in fact, defined as “an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est which is [both] (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or immi-
nent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ”25 Second, a plaintiff must show a
“causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and
third, “it must be ‘likely’ . . . that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’ ”26
In laying out the modern elements of standing, Lujan also demonstrated
the impact of the doctrine’s constitutional roots. The case concerned a chal-
lenge to a federal regulation that restricted the reach of an Endangered Spe-
cies Act (ESA) protection to within U.S. territory.27 Plaintiffs challenged the
regulation under the ESA’s citizen-suit provision.28 They alleged that the
move risked the extinction of certain species abroad, which would cause aes-
thetic and vocational injuries to the plaintiffs.29 But because the plaintiffs had
no plans to even visit the habitats of the threatened species, the Court found
no cognizable injury and dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for lack of standing.30
22 . See, e .g ., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If today’s deci-
sion is correct, it is within the power of Congress to authorize any interested person to manage
(through the courts) the Executive’s enforcement of any law . . . .”); Martin H. Redish & Sopan
Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (but Unrecognized) Sep-
arations of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2014).
23 . See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential
Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 737–42 (2009).
24. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 164–65, 198–99 (“Lujan may well be one of the most im-
portant standing cases since World War II. . . . Indeed, the decision ranks among the most im-
portant in history in terms of the sheer number of federal statutes that it apparently has
invalidated.”).
25. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). The Court first introduced the injury-in-fact
requirement in 1970, shifting away from a previous requirement of legal injury. Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970).
26 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
38 (1976)). This Note focuses exclusively on injury in fact’s concreteness requirement.
27 . Id . at 557–58.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012) (“[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf . . . to enjoin any person . . . alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chap-
ter . . . .”).
29 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–67.
30 . Id . at 563–64, 578.
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The Court rejected the claim that plaintiffs could establish standing via
the ESA’s citizen-suit provision without alleging an injury in fact.31 It rea-
soned that the statutory procedure in question must protect some “separate
concrete interest,” not a “generally available grievance about government.”32
This established an important strand in the Court’s standing jurisprudence:
because standing is constitutional, Congress lacks the authority to disregard
injury in fact.33
Nevertheless, Congress still has a role to play in conferring standing,
though that role is imprecise. The majority acknowledged the special nature
of “procedural rights”34 insofar as they justify loosening the standards for
immediacy and redressability.35 Justice Kennedy, in an influential concur-
rence, went a step further, observing that “Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or con-
troversy where none existed before.”36 The ESA’s citizen-suit provision failed
to do so, however, because it did not “identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate [it] to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”37 Beyond these
comments, however, Congress’s authority to bestow standing lacked much-
needed clarity.
B. Spokeo and the Concrete Injury Requirement
Spokeo picked up where Lujan left off and gave concreteness meaning
independent of particularity. Thomas Robins filed suit against Spokeo, Inc.,
an online “people search engine” often used for background checks,38 for
violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).39 Robins claimed that
Spokeo listed false information—that he was married, had children, was in
his 50s, was wealthy, and held a graduate degree—when Robins was actually
31 . Id . at 572–73.
32 . Id . “We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assured-
ly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete
interest . . . .” Id . at 573 n.8.
33. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009).
34. A procedural right is conferred by statute or regulation and entitles an individual to
a particular process, like access to judicial review or information from the government. See
Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 169, 174 n.21 (2012).
35 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
36 . Id . at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1549 (2016).
37 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38 . Online Background Reports, SPOKEO, https://www.spokeo.com/background-check
[https://perma.cc/ACB9-HYPC].
39. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10–05306 ODW (AGRx), 2011 WL 597867, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011), rev’d, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
The FCRA imposes procedural requirements on credit agencies to ensure that consumer credit
reports are accurate, fair, and utilized properly. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
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young, uneducated, and unemployed.40 These inaccuracies were caused by
Spokeo’s alleged failure to comply with the FCRA’s regulations for consumer
reporting agencies, particularly the obligation to “follow reasonable proce-
dures to assure maximum possible accuracy.”41 The district court dismissed
Robins’s claim for want of a cognizable injury.42 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
concluding that Robins’s injury was both concrete and particular because his
“personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individual-
ized rather than collective.”43 The Supreme Court ultimately vacated and
remanded, holding that the Ninth Circuit improperly found Robins’s alleged
procedural violation to be a concrete injury in fact.44
The Court agreed that Robins’s injury was sufficiently particular but
found that the Ninth Circuit overlooked the concreteness requirement.45 In
so doing, the Court found that particularity alone is necessary but not suffi-
cient for standing—“[a]n injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’ ”46 The
Spokeo Court further explained that an injury is concrete when it is “ ‘de fac-
to’; . . . it must actually exist.”47 Concrete means “ ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’ ”48
But the Court clarified that “concrete” does not necessarily mean “tangi-
ble.”49 Rather, concrete injuries take two forms: tangible or intangible.50 Tan-
gible concrete injuries, the Court admitted, are “easier to recognize” than the
intangible variety.51 In fact, commentators generally agree that tangibility is
40 . See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”). For examples of
reasonable procedures that Spokeo could have implemented, see Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Mis-
speaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 233, 236–37 (2017).
42 . Robins, 2011 WL 597867, at *2.
43. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540
(2016).
44 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.
45 . Id . at 1545.
46 . Id . at 1548.
47 . Id . (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009)).
48 . Id . (quoting Concrete, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabr.
ed. 1971), and Concrete, THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (un-
abr. ed. 1967)).
49 . Id . at 1549.
50. This choice of words contributes to doctrinal confusion. Concrete, for example, is
defined as “tangible,” suggesting an intangible entity is no longer concrete. Concrete,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concrete [https://perma.cc
/3NZT-CXQE]. Intangible is further defined as “an abstract quality or attribute.” Intangible,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intangible [https://perma
.cc/SK65-9Z87] (emphasis added). See also Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law,
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 454 (2017) (“These . . . tools of statutory construction . . . are entirely
misplaced here because the phrase ‘concrete and particularized’ is . . . invented by the Court
itself.”).
51 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
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sufficient to establish concreteness.52 The more interesting question, and the
focus of this Note, is which intangible injuries are sufficiently concrete for
purposes of standing.
C. Intangible Harms
Spokeo does not affect standing for harms arising from violations of the
Constitution.53 To help identify intangible concrete injuries that are not con-
stitutionally derived, the Court provided branching lines of inquiry for lower
courts to puzzle through.54 At bottom, an intangible injury is concrete if it is
supported, to some indefinite degree, by history and the judgment of Con-
gress, and the injury entails at least a risk of real harm to the plaintiff.55
For cognizable intangible injuries, the Court directed that “both history
and the judgment of Congress play important roles.”56 The history compo-
nent requires a court to inquire “whether an alleged intangible harm has a
close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing
a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”57 Use of the language
“close relationship” is significant—it implies that courts should engage in a
process of analogy but need not find a one-to-one analogue between a plain-
tiff’s alleged harm and the common law.58
Further, the judgment of Congress “is also instructive and important”
because “Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms.”59 The
Spokeo Court referred back to Lujan and observed “that Congress may ‘ele-
vat[e] to the status of legally cognizable . . . injuries that were previously in-
adequate,’ ”60 and that it may “define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed be-
52 . See Craig Konnoth & Seth Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
47, 51–52 (2016) (“It appears that a ‘tangible’ injury is a sufficient but not a necessary condi-
tion for showing the constitutionally requisite ‘concrete’ injury in fact.”).
53. Though not every violation of a constitutional right confers standing, Spokeo does
not appear to alter the Court’s method of vindicating constitutional injuries. See id . at 52–53.
For example, the Court highlights two cognizable intangible injuries, violations of the right to
free speech and right to free exercise, that are both constitutionally derived. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct.
at 1549.
54. For an insightful flowchart of the Spokeo analysis, see Konnoth & Kreimer, supra
note 52, at 62.
55 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
56 . Id .
57 . Id . (emphasis added).
58 . See Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A] close
relationship does not require that the newly proscribed conduct would ‘give rise to a cause of
action under common law.’ But it does require that newly established causes of action protect
essentially the same interests that traditional causes of action sought to protect.” (citation omit-
ted) (quoting In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639 (3d
Cir. 2017)).
59 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
60 . Id . (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
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fore.”61 Yet the Court qualified that a statutory violation that is otherwise
“divorced from any concrete harm”—termed “a bare procedural violation”—
does not confer standing.62
Congress’s judgment is especially relevant when a plaintiff’s alleged in-
tangible injury manifests as a “risk of real harm.”63 The Spokeo Court recog-
nized that this “real harm” can be uncontroversially concrete even when
“difficult to prove or measure,” such as in the case of slander per se.64 Plain-
tiffs can invoke a congressionally granted procedural right—here, the right
to enforce an accurate report—meant to protect the plaintiff from an intan-
gible risk of harm without the “need [to] allege any additional harm beyond
the one Congress has identified.”65 As an example, the Court cited its line of
cases that upheld standing when plaintiffs suffered various “informational
injuries,” like voters who were denied information on campaign contribu-
tions to which they were statutorily entitled.66 Some procedural violations
are sufficiently concrete in themselves, while others require articulating a
consequent risk of harm from the violation.67
Though the majority opinion punted on the resolution of Robins’s
standing by remanding the case, it provided two examples of procedural vio-
lations of the FCRA that would nevertheless fall short of a concrete injury.68
First, Robins’s information could be entirely accurate but Spokeo simply
failed to provide him statutorily required notice.69 Though a procedural vio-
lation, this would not constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing. Sec-
ond, his information could be inaccurate but trivially so.70 For example, an
“incorrect zip code” could not, “without more, . . . work any concrete
61 . Id . (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring)).
62 . Id .
63 . Id .
64 . Id . (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 569–70 (AM. LAW INST. 1938)).
65 . Id . (emphasis in original).
66 . Id . (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), and Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
491 U.S. 440 (1989)); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (granting
standing to “tester” plaintiffs who were denied accurate information required by the Fair
Housing Act). Informational injuries are further discussed infra Section III.E.
67 . See Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 52, at 56.
68. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg largely agreed with the majority’s articulation of the
law but concluded that Robins had already adequately alleged a concrete injury to his employ-
ment prospects. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1554–55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “[M]isinformation
about his education, family situation, and economic status . . . could affect his fortune in the
job market,” a harm that the FCRA “aimed to prevent.” Id . at 1556. Justice Ginsburg also em-
phasized that the majority’s clear distinction between concreteness and particularity is a novel
explanation of the Court’s standing doctrine. Id . at 1555.
69 . Id . at 1550 (majority opinion).
70 . Id .
480 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:471
harm.”71 Whether other inaccuracies were merely trivial or instead resulted
in concrete injury became a question for the Ninth Circuit on remand.72
The Court’s discussion of congressional judgment left lingering ques-
tions. First, little was said about the relationship between the dual factors of
history and judgment. Is the test, for example, disjunctive or conjunctive?
Here, some courts and commentators have adopted a disjunctive interpreta-
tion: an intangible injury may be concrete even if one of the two factors is
not present.73 Second, the Court did not explain how to identify Congress’s
judgment nor how much weight it carries in the analysis. Here, lower courts
have largely cohered around a two-step analysis first articulated by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Strubel v . Comenity Bank.74 The Ninth Circuit, in the remand
of Spokeo, summarized the Strubel test as whether (1) the provision at issue
was established to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interest and (2) the interest
was actually at risk of harm in the case.75
On remand, the Ninth Circuit again granted Robins standing.76 In
Spokeo’s wake, lower courts have struggled to adopt a consistent methodolo-
gy for identifying intangible concrete injuries across a range of alleged viola-
tions of comparable consumer protection laws. This muddled jurisprudence
is exemplified by the conflicting approaches that the Third and Ninth Circuit
have embraced, which is the focus of Part II.
II. THE DUTTA–LONG CIRCUIT SPLIT
The divergent outcomes reached in Dutta v . State Farm Mutual Insur-
ance77 and Long v . Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority78
demonstrate the lingering confusion left by Spokeo. Ambiguity remained not
only for Robins’s particular claim on remand before the Ninth Circuit79 but
also for other violations of the FCRA and a host of similarly structured stat-
71 . Id . This example has been criticized. See infra text accompanying notes 249–252.
72 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 n.8. The Ninth Circuit’s remanded opinion, Robins v .
Spokeo, Inc ., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017), cert . denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018), is discussed infra
Section III.B.
73 . See Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 2019) (de-
scribing the two factors as “independent”); Dreher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 856 F.3d 337,
345 (4th Cir. 2017); Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 52, at 62.
74. 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Spokeo . . . instruct[s] that an alleged procedural
violation can by itself manifest concrete injury where Congress conferred the procedural right
to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interests and where the procedural violation presents a ‘risk of
real harm’ to that concrete interest . . . .” (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549)); see also Macy v.
GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 754–56 (6th Cir. 2018); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers
Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De
Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 728 n.4 (7th Cir. 2016).
75 . Robins, 867 F.3d at 1113.
76 . Id . at 1118; see also infra Section III.B.1.
77. 895 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2018).
78. 903 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2018).
79 . Robins, 867 F.3d at 1118.
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utes designed to protect consumer interests. This split between the Third
and Ninth Circuits constitutes a meaningful issue for plaintiffs challenging
violations of the FCRA disclosure requirements but also offers a useful heu-
ristic for conceiving of intangible harms under Spokeo.
The FCRA regulates the use of credit reports for hiring and employment
purposes.80 An employer may, based on information in a properly obtained
report, choose to take an “adverse action” against a current or prospective
employee.81 Before taking such an adverse action, however, the employer
must first provide the employee a copy of the report and an opportunity to
respond.82 Though Congress’s most obvious concern was to correct inaccu-
rate reports, the provision also allows the employee to “bring additional facts
to the employer’s attention” and “present her side of the story ‘even where
the facts are clear.’ ”83 The Third and Ninth Circuits have split over whether
failing to provide an employee a copy of her report constitutes a cognizable
injury when there is no likelihood that presenting the employee’s side of the
story will alter the ultimate outcome.
The Ninth Circuit in Dutta concluded that such a plaintiff lacks stand-
ing.84 As part of its hiring process, State Farm obtained Bobby Dutta’s credit
report in 2014.85 After identifying issues in his credit history that disqualified
him for the position, State Farm informed Dutta that he had been rejected.86
Dutta was not provided an actual copy of his credit report, which contained
several factual errors, until several days after he had been rejected.87 Even af-
ter Dutta identified the report’s mistakes, however, State Farm again in-
formed him that he had been rejected.88 The Ninth Circuit denied Dutta
standing for his claim under the FCRA because State Farm’s procedural vio-
lation did not ultimately harm Dutta.89 Citing State Farm’s undisputed hir-
ing policy, the court concluded that the accurate portions of his credit report
“alone disqualified Dutta from” the position.90 Because any inaccuracies that
Dutta provided would be immaterial to his employment, his inability to ex-
plain them was not a concrete injury.91
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012 & Supp. 2018).
81 . Id . § 1681(b)(3).
82 . Id . The employer must also provide “a description in writing of the rights of the
consumer under this subchapter.” Id . § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii); see also infra Section III.E.
83. Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985)).
84. Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2018).
85 . Id . at 1170.
86 . Id .
87 . Id .
88 . Id . at 1170–71.
89 . Id . at 1176.
90 . Id .
91 . Id .
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The Third Circuit in Long, on the other hand, recognized standing for a
similar situation. Three plaintiffs, each with prior drug convictions, applied
for employment with the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Au-
thority (SEPTA).92 Though it first appeared that the plaintiffs had been suc-
cessfully hired, SEPTA later informed each that they were not hired pursuant
to SEPTA’s “ ‘categorical lifetime ban’ on hiring anyone convicted of a [drug]
crime.”93 Crucially, SEPTA did not provide the plaintiffs copies of their
background checks before informing them of its decisions.94 The plaintiffs
filed an FCRA claim, arguing that, while their background checks were accu-
rate, SEPTA nevertheless deprived them of their statutory right to review the
reports and respond before an adverse action.95 In recognizing standing, the
Third Circuit insisted that “the FCRA does not condition the right to receive
a consumer report on whether having the report would allow an individual
to stave off an adverse employment action.”96
These conflicting outcomes stem from the courts’ differing views of the
interests protected by the FCRA’s prior disclosure provision. Tellingly, the
Ninth Circuit exclusively characterized the disclosure provision’s purpose as
correcting “false information” and providing “the opportunity to contest er-
roneous information.”97 The Third Circuit, however, adopted a broader view
of the provision, going beyond merely ensuring the accuracy of reports.98
Specifically, the Third Circuit identified four purposes served: “[A]ccuracy,
relevancy, proper utilization, and fairness.”99 Even if the reports had been
perfectly accurate, the plaintiffs were still deprived of a fair and transparent
process that would have allowed them to present their side of the story. The
Third Circuit also emphasized Congress’s prophylactic aims, interpreting the
FCRA’s disclosure provision as serving important functions beyond the em-
ployment opportunity at issue.100 For the plaintiffs in Long, the lack of prior
disclosure, while not affecting their immediate employment at SEPTA, did
have other repercussions. The court noted that prior disclosure allows “indi-
viduals to know beforehand when their consumer reports might be used
92. Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2018).
93 . Id . at 317 (quoting First Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 58, Long v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., No. 2:16-cv-1991, 2017 WL 1332716 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2017)).
94 . Id .
95 . Id . If SEPTA is found to be noncompliant with the FCRA, the plaintiffs could recov-
er statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2012).
96 . Long, 903 F.3d at 319.
97. Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2018).
98 . Long, 903 F.3d at 318 (“[T]he statute confers a broader right than simply to be free
from adverse action based on inaccurate information.”).
99 . Id . at 319 (“The advance notice requirement, then, supports both accuracy and fair-
ness.”).
100 . See id . at 318–19.
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against them . . . either in the current job application process[] or going for-
ward in other job applications.”101
These questions—What did Congress intend to accomplish with this
statute? And how should the court characterize the injury in question?—are
at the center of judicial disagreements after Spokeo. Beyond the FCRA, the
enforcement of a host of other consumer protection statutes, including the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),102 Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA),103 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA),104 depends on how lower courts treat Congress’s judgment and
characterize plaintiffs’ harm.
III. CATEGORIES OF INTANGIBLE HARMS
Spokeo has affected consumer protection laws unevenly.105 For example,
while it risks extinguishing claims arising under FACTA, claims under
TCPA are virtually unimpeded.
Having little Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have identified nu-
merous harms when analyzing a plaintiff’s intangible yet concrete injury.
This Note analyzes and categorizes the intangible harms recognized by lower
courts into five categories.
1. Privacy harms, both those resulting from distribution of plaintiffs’
personal information to third parties as well as claims of intrusion
upon seclusion and breach of confidence when third parties are
absent.
2. Personal and property torts in which courts have analogized
claims of slander, infliction of emotional distress, and several
property interests to modern statutory violations.
3. Pecuniary costs that consist of financial harms suffered by plain-
tiffs.
4. Risks of harm that plaintiffs may suffer from a statutory violation,
especially identity theft or potentially fraudulent debt collection.
5. Informational injuries that plaintiffs have suffered by being de-
nied statutorily guaranteed information necessary to exercise
some substantive right.
101 . Id . at 319. The Third Circuit also noted that SEPTA’s argument has a degree of cir-
cularity to it, as “the consumer cannot know whether his report is accurate unless it is disclosed
to him.” Id .
102. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.).
103. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
104. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 875 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692p (2012)).
105. This Note will focus on the FCRA, FACTA, TCPA, and FDCPA, using other statutes
to draw comparisons.
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As this Part demonstrates, these categories are not fixed, but they never-
theless provide a starting point for assessing the state of the doctrine.106
A. Privacy Harms
In these cases, plaintiffs allege that defendant’s statutory violation result-
ed in a concrete injury to their privacy interests by revealing identifying, of-
ten sensitive, information about the individual or by entering the plaintiff’s
personal space.107 Courts have identified three variants on this core claim: a
“traditional” invasion of privacy through dispersion of identifying infor-
mation,108 intrusion upon a plaintiff’s seclusion,109 and breach of confi-
dence.110 Distinguishing between these categories can be difficult, and much
turns on the individual judges’ characterization of the harm.
1. Invasion of Privacy
Under Spokeo’s first factor for intangible harms, courts have identified a
robust historical basis on which plaintiffs may allege privacy harms. For ex-
ample, in Eichenberger v . ESPN, Inc ., the Ninth Circuit considered an alleged
violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) resulting from sharing
customers’ information with a third party.111 The court identified a historical
corollary to the alleged harm, observing that “[v]iolations of the right to pri-
vacy have long been actionable at common law.”112 Applying this common
law conception to modern concerns about individuals’ information, the
court continued that “both the common law and the literal understanding of
privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or
her person.”113 The Third Circuit similarly identified privacy harms as a dis-
tinct injury. In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc . Data Breach Litigation,
concerning release of information in violation of the FCRA, Judge Shwartz’s
106. “It’s difficult, we recognize, to identify the line between what Congress may, and
may not, do in creating an ‘injury in fact.’ Put five smart lawyers in a room, and it won’t take
long to appreciate the difficulty of the task at hand.” Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616,
623 (6th Cir. 2018).
107 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
108. Personal information could include “names, dates of birth, marital statuses, genders,
occupations, employers, Social Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers.” Galaria v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016). But not all identifiable infor-
mation is necessarily private. Cf . Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2017) (“[A] party does not satisfy the concreteness analysis ‘simply by appending the word
“privacy” to her allegation.’ ” (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S. in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 14, Susinno, 862 F.3d 346 (No. 16-3277)).
109 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
110 . See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
111. 876 F.3d 979, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2017).
112 . Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 983.
113 . Id . (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 763 (1989)).
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concurring opinion clarified that an individual’s injury premised on a priva-
cy interest is sufficient even without an injury tied to economic loss.114 Priva-
cy on its own has “sufficient historical roots to satisfy . . . concrete harm for
standing purposes.”115
Courts have also found that invasion of privacy satisfies Spokeo’s second
factor: the judgment of Congress. Courts inquire, on a statute-by-statute ba-
sis, whether Congress intended the procedural requirement in question to
safeguard an individual’s privacy interest. For example, courts have held that
the VPPA116 and the FCRA117 both include procedural requirements cali-
brated to prevent privacy injuries.
Eichenberger and Horizon Healthcare invoked a distinction that sepa-
rates viable privacy injuries from nonviable ones: the personal information
in question must be disseminated.118 The centrality of dissemination in pri-
vacy harms is demonstrated in a D.C. Circuit opinion.119 In that case, four
truck drivers sued the Department of Transportation because its database
listed inaccurate information about them in violation of the FCRA.120 The
court recognized standing for the two truckers whose information had been
shared with third parties, but not for the two whose information had re-
mained in the department’s control.121 This distinction is grounded in both
history and the judgment of Congress. First, the court observed that there is
“no historical or common-law analog where the mere existence of inaccurate
information, absent dissemination, amounts to concrete injury.”122 Second,
the court recognized that “the harm Congress was concerned about was the
dissemination of inaccurate information, not its mere existence.”123
114. 846 F.3d 625, 643 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, J., concurring).
115 . Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642.
116 . Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 983 (concluding that “the VPPA provision at issue here[]
codifies a context-specific extension of the substantive right to privacy”).
117 . Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639 (“[W]ith the passage of FCRA, Congress established that
the unauthorized dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an
injury in and of itself . . . .”).
118 . See Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 981–82; Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638 (“ ‘[U]nauthorized
disclosures of information’ have long been seen as injurious.” (quoting In re Nickelodeon Con-
sumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016))).
119. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
120 . Id . at 340. DOT was obligated to comply with the FCRA. 49 U.S.C. § 31150(b)(1)
(2012).
121 . Owner-Operator Indep . Drivers Ass’n, 879 F.3d at 345, 347.
122 . Id . at 344–45.
123 . Id . at 345. Claims under the Cable Communications Policy Act similarly demon-
strate the centrality of dissemination in privacy claims. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,
846 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no indication of any violation of the plaintiff’s
privacy because there is no indication that Time Warner has released, or allowed anyone to
disseminate, any of the plaintiff’s personal information . . . .”); Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns,
Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016).
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2. Intrusion upon Seclusion
A second variant of an individual’s privacy interest is the harm of intru-
sion upon seclusion.124 Unlike the invasion-of-privacy harms, these cases in-
volve intrusions into a person’s space. Courts have most often identified this
harm in cases arising under the TCPA in which defendants called or other-
wise messaged individuals without their consent.125 For example, in Van Pat-
ten v . Vertical Fitness, the Ninth Circuit held that unsolicited text messages
sent to the plaintiff satisfied the concrete injury requirement.126 Invoking
Spokeo’s two factors, history and the judgment of Congress, the court ob-
served that “[a]ctions to remedy defendants’ . . . intrusion upon seclusion,
and nuisance have long been heard by American courts” and, further, that
“Congress sought to protect consumers from the unwanted intrusion and
nuisance of unsolicited telemarketing phone calls and fax advertisements.”127
The Third Circuit reached the same conclusions in the context of unsolicited
phone calls.128 District courts have almost uniformly reached the same con-
clusion when presented with similar facts.129
3. Breach of Confidence
The third privacy variant is harm resulting from a breach of confi-
dence—a holder of data violates a legal duty to refrain from disclosing spe-
124 . See Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“[I]ntrusion upon seclusion is a well-recognized subset of common law invasion of privacy.”).
It is unclear whether businesses can invoke rights to privacy or seclusion. Compare Fauley v.
Drug Depot, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1011–12 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“[B]ecause businesses do not
have privacy interests in seclusion or solitude, Fauley’s allegation that the fax, that was sent to
his business, constitutes an invasion of privacy does not allege injury as required under Article
III.” (citations omitted)), with Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. MedTox Sci., Inc., 250 F. Supp.
3d 354, 357 n.1 (D. Minn. 2017) (observing that courts have reached opposing conclusions).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2012 & Supp. 2018). Courts have also analogized violation of the
VPPA to intrusion upon seclusion. See, e .g ., Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336,
1341 (11th Cir. 2017).
126. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC., 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Un-
solicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and
disturb the solitude of their recipients.”).
127 . Id .
128 . Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351 (“The TCPA addresses itself directly to single prerecorded
calls from cell phones, and states that its prohibition acts ‘in the interest of [ ] privacy rights.’ ”
(alteration in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C))).
129 . See, e .g ., McCall Law Firm, PLLC v. Crystal Queen, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1131
(E.D. Ark. 2018); A.D. ex rel . Serrano v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 14 C 10106, 2016 WL
4417077, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2018);
Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 645–46 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (“In essence, the
TCPA can be seen as merely liberalizing and codifying the application of this common law tort
to a particularly intrusive type of unwanted telephone call.”).
December 2019] A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible Harms 487
cific information provided by the consumer.130 Unlike a traditional privacy
tort, there is no third-party requirement.131 Instead, “the harm from a breach
of confidence occurs when the plaintiff’s trust in the breaching party is vio-
lated.”132 This theory is not commonly used but has been endorsed by the
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.133 Muransky v . Godiva Chocolatier, Inc . analo-
gized the defendant-business’s practice of printing ten digits of a plaintiff’s
credit card number on customer receipts, in violation of FACTA,134 to a
breach of confidence because the information was “not kept confidential.”135
B. Personal and Property Torts
Courts have also identified theories of standing premised on historical
torts to persons and property, including harm to reputation via defamation
and slander, emotional harm, and traditional property torts of trespass to
chattels and implied bailment.
1. Defamation and Slander
The first tortious harms are defamation and slander. The Ninth Circuit’s
reconsideration of Spokeo on remand typifies these injuries.136 First, the
court stated that the FCRA’s prohibition on inaccurate credit reports was in-
tended to protect individuals’ concrete interests.137 Second, it analogized
Robins’s inaccurate report to “reputational and privacy interests that have
130. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 624 (2018).
131 . Id . at 620, 629 (“The privacy torts also face a conceptual hurdle because their em-
phasis on public exposure of private information is misplaced in the data breach context.”
(footnote omitted)).
132. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1190 (11th Cir. 2019).
133. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1209 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2018)
(citing Solow-Niederman, supra note 130), vacated, 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019); see Jeffries
v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But see Kamal v. J. Crew
Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[W]e do not believe a breach of confidence action
is sufficiently analogous absent third-party disclosure.”).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2012). See additional discussion of FACTA infra Section
III.D.
135 . Muransky, 922 F.3d at 1191 (11th Cir. 2019) (“A consumer provides a merchant
with his credit card number with the expectation that it will remain secret . . . . FACTA gives
legal protection to that confidentiality interest by permitting merchants to print only the last
five digits of a credit card number.”); see also Solow-Niederman, supra note 130, at 625
(“[G]iven their relationship to consumers, the holders of consumer data in commercial trans-
actions should be labeled with a distinct term: data confidants.”).
136. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017), cert . denied, 138 S. Ct. 931
(2018).
137 . Id . at 1113–14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“[G]iven the ubiquity and importance of
consumer reports in modern life . . . the real-world implications of material inaccuracies in
those reports seem patent on their face. . . . [T]he legislative record includes pages of discussion
of how such inaccuracies may harm consumers . . . .”).
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long been protected in the law,” particularly when defamatory statements
relate to a person’s business.138 Importantly, these historical actions required
no evidence of actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.139 Finally, Robins’s inac-
curacies were not trivial but risked “real harm” because of the importance of
credit reports to employers.140
Courts have made two additional observations about slander as an inju-
ry. First, as with privacy harms, historical torts of libel or slander per se “re-
quire evidence of publication” or dissemination to third parties.141 Second,
any slanderous information must be harmful; trivial inaccuracies are not suf-
ficient.142 As the Ninth Circuit stated, not “every inaccuracy in these catego-
ries . . . will necessarily establish concrete injury.”143
2. Infliction of Emotional Distress
The second tortious theory confers standing to plaintiffs that suffered
emotional distress as a result of a statutory violation.144 In Ben-Davies v .
Blibaum & Associates, the Fourth Circuit held that an erroneous statement
of the amount that plaintiff owed145 was a sufficiently concrete injury to con-
fer standing because the plaintiff “ ‘suffered’ . . . actually existing intangible
harms that affect her personally: ‘emotional distress, anger, and frustra-
tion.’ ”146 Unlike other cases in which courts only mentioned emotional dis-
138 . Id . at 1114 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 570 (AM. LAW INST. 1938)).
139 . Id . at 1114–15 (“Courts have long entertained causes of action to vindicate intangi-
ble harms caused by certain untruthful disclosures about individuals, and we respect Con-
gress’s judgment that a similar harm would result from inaccurate credit reporting.”).
140 . Id . at 1116–17 (listing “age, marital status, educational background, and employ-
ment history”). This resembles Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1556 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 344–45
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
142 . Robins, 867 F.3d at 1117.
143 . Id . at 1117 n.4.
144. Ben-Davies v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 695 F. App’x 674 (4th Cir. 2017).
145. The plaintiff sued under the FDCPA, which prohibits, in part, “[t]he false represen-
tation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (2012).
Here, the defendant allegedly “demand[ed] payment of an incorrect sum based on the calcula-
tion of an interest rate not authorized by law.” Ben-Davies, 695 F. App’x at 676.
146 . Ben-Davies, 695 F. App’x at 676.
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tress as one of several viable theories for standing,147 the Fourth Circuit iden-
tified emotional distress as the plaintiff’s sole basis for standing.148
3. Trespass to Chattels
A third tort-based theory of intangible harm relates to the plaintiff’s
property interests and has arisen in the context of the TCPA.149 Mey v . Got
Warranty, Inc ., a district court case, applied the historical tort of trespass to
chattels when it held that the defendant’s telemarketing robocalls had uti-
lized the plaintiff’s phone without permission.150 Invoking this historical tra-
dition as well as Congress’s view of the matter, the court observed:
[T]he TCPA can be viewed as merely applying this common law tort to a
21st-century form of personal property and a 21st-century method of in-
trusion. Applying this ancient tort to these calls . . . is particularly appropri-
ate since electronic intrusion is so much easier, and so much more readily
repeated, than physical misuse of a chattel.151
From a plaintiff’s perspective, this theory carries the additional benefit of
conferring standing “[e]ven if the consumer does not answer the call or hear
the ring.”152 Though Mey provides the most explicit application of this tort to
modern statutory violations, the court noted that it is not the first to consid-
er the analogy to modern technology.153
147 . See, e .g ., Vanamann v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 735 F. App’x 260, 261 (9th Cir.
2018); Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 991 (11th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging
that the plaintiff “was very angry” and “cried a lot” but ultimately recognizing standing on oth-
er theories); Cabiness v. Educ. Fin. Sols., LLC, No. 16-cv-01109-JST, 2016 WL 5791411, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (“The additional harms alleged by Ms. Cabiness in her complaint—i.e.
suffering ‘a large amount of stress and anxiety’ and being ‘concerned and upset by the constant
calls’ . . . —are intangible.”).
148 . See Ben-Davies, 695 F. App’x at 676 (identifying emotional distress “as a ‘direct con-
sequence’ of” the FDCPA violation).
149. As previously noted, the TCPA prohibits various forms of phone calls and faxes
without the recipient’s consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012 & Supp. 2018).
150. 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 646 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (“The harm recognized by the ancient
common law claim of trespass to chattels—the intentional dispossession of chattel, or the use
of or interference with a chattel that is in the possession of another, is a close analog for a
TCPA violation.”).
151 . Mey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 647.
152 . Id .
153 . Id . (“Courts have applied this tort theory to the very actions alleged here—unwanted
telephone calls.”). Other district courts have followed Mey. See, e .g ., Abante Rooter & Plumb-
ing, Inc. v. Pivotal Payments, Inc., No. 16-cv-05486-JCS, 2017 WL 733123, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
24, 2017) (“The Mey court reasoned that ‘[t]he harm recognized by the ancient common law
claim of trespass to chattels—the intentional dispossession of chattel, or the use of or interfer-
ence with a chattel that is in the possession of another, is a close analog for a TCPA violation.’ ”
(quoting Mey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 646)); Martinez v. TD Bank USA, N.A., 225 F. Supp. 3d 261,
270 (D.N.J. 2016).
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4. Implied Bailment
Plaintiffs can also allege standing based on the common law claim for
breach of an implied bailment agreement.154 For example, in Muransky, the
Eleventh Circuit compared the defendant-business’s FACTA violation to
older cases in which a merchant is entrusted with a customer’s property and
is held liable if the property is not returned in the required manner.155 A
business that accepts credit cards, then, is a bailee who must return sensitive
card information without exceeding the limitations set by statute.156 The
court admitted that this theory is usually applied in the context of tangible
property but nevertheless held that the analogy was close enough for Con-
gress to use its power to create a cause of action.157
C. Pecuniary Costs
Plaintiffs consistently establish standing when they allege the following
batch of tangible harms—even when they border on the trivial. But ambigui-
ty lingers as to where the precise divide between tangible and intangible
harms lies.
The first group of cases arises under the TCPA, which prohibits various
unsolicited phone calls and faxes.158 Courts have granted standing for an ar-
ray of pecuniary harms resulting from receiving unsolicited faxes, including
the cost of keeping the fax machine turned on and the cost of paper and ink
consumed.159 Though unquestionably tangible, these harms amount to ques-
tionable costs. For example, Florence Endocrine Clinic v . Arriva Medical con-
cerned a single medical form sent on four occasions.160 Similarly, an
154. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1209 (11th Cir. 2018), vacated,
922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019); see also McCloud v. Save-A-Lot Knoxville, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-
486, 2019 WL 2250269, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. May 24, 2019) (considering, but seemingly rejecting,
a plaintiff’s use of the implied bailment theory); Bailey v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 1:17-CV-
03336-MHC-AJB, 2019 WL 2291895, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2019) (endorsing implied bail-
ment as a basis for plaintiff’s standing in a FACTA case).
155 . Id .
156 . Id . at 1210.
157 . Id . at 1211. Justice Gorsuch, in his Carpenter dissent, similarly suggested that “an-
cient principles” of property may be applicable in “modern data cases.” Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (characterizing “your data” as
“your modern-day papers and effects”). But see Jessica Litman, Information Priva-
cy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000) (arguing against the analogy of personal
data as property).
158. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2018).
159 . See, e .g ., Florence Endocrine Clinic, PLLC v. Arriva Med., LLC, 858 F.3d 1362, 1366
(11th Cir. 2017); Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. MedTox Sci., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 354, 359
(D. Minn. 2017) (“Sandusky’s allegation that MedTox’s violation of the TCPA disrupted
Sandusky’s business by tying up its fax line, wasted Sandusky’s paper and ink, and wasted the
time of Sandusky’s employees is sufficient to establish standing.”).
160 . Florence Endocrine Clinic, 858 F.3d at 1364–65.
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influential pre-Spokeo decision in the Eleventh Circuit concluded that occu-
pying a fax machine for even “one minute” was sufficient for standing.161
TCPA claims from unsolicited phone calls produce similar results.
Plaintiffs have received standing because unsolicited calls drain a phone’s
electricity, increase wear on a phone, and incur call or text charges.162 Here,
again, the actual magnitude of harm is dubious; even a generous estimate of
the cost of electricity involved amounts to spare change.163 Further, courts
have held that even a single unsolicited call is sufficient for standing purpos-
es when plaintiffs invoke one of the above theories of harm.164 Despite the
relatively trivial nature of these harms, courts have repeatedly cited these ar-
guments to grant standing under the TCPA.165
Courts have identified two other financial harms: mitigation costs and
reduced credit scores. First, in Galaria v . Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co .,
the Sixth Circuit granted standing because the plaintiffs expended “reasona-
bly incurred mitigation costs” in responding to defendant’s data breach that
exposed the plaintiff to the risk of fraud.166 Second, a lower credit score con-
ferred standing in two cases. In Evans v . Portfolio Recovery Associates, the
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s inaccurate credit rating, caused by an
FDCPA violation, constituted an “appreciable risk of harm.”167 The court
reasoned that an inaccurate rating “produces a variety of negative effects”
161. Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1251
(11th Cir. 2015).
162. Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 644–45 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (“For
consumers with prepaid cell phones . . . unwanted calls cause direct, concrete, monetary injury
by depleting limited minutes that the consumer has paid for . . . . In addition, all ATDS calls
deplete a cell phone’s battery, and the cost of electricity to recharge the phone is also a tangible
harm. While certainly small, the cost is real, and the cumulative effect could be consequen-
tial.”); Martinez v. TD Bank USA, N.A., 225 F. Supp. 3d 261, 270 (D.N.J. 2016) (similar).
163. Joshua Scott Olin, Note, Rethinking Article III Standing in Class Action Consumer
Protection Cases Following Spokeo v. Robins, U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV., Winter 2017, at 69, 85
(“The iPhone . . . costs about twenty-five cents per year to charge. . . . Mey says that a quarter’s
worth of damage, yearly, is enough to confer standing upon a plaintiff.”).
164. Etzel v. Hooters of Am., LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (“Injuries
that occur from a single call or text (whether from depleted battery life, wasted time, or annoy-
ance) would be de minimis, according to Defendant. However, the language of the TCPA is
clear that a violation can occur from a single call.”).
165 . See Casso’s Wellness Store & Gym, L.L.C. v. Spectrum Lab. Prods., Inc., No. 17-
2161, 2018 WL 733216, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2018) (“[C]ourts subsequent to Spokeo[] have
repeatedly held that allegations of wasted time in reviewing unsolicited fax advertisements and
the use of paper and ink toner in printing those advertisements constitute concrete injuries as
required to have Article III standing under the TCPA . . . .”); Horton v. Sw. Med. Consulting,
LLC, No. 17–CV–0266–CVE–mjx, 2017 WL 2951922, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2017) (col-
lecting cases); LaVigne v. First Cmty. Bancshares, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1146 (D.N.M.
2016) (“Regardless of how small the harm is, it is actual and it is real.”).
166. 663 F. App’x 384, 386, 388–90 (6th Cir. 2016).
167. 889 F.3d 337, 345 (7th Cir. 2018).
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because of its ubiquitous use.168 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit cited the fact
that the “[plaintiff’s] credit score dropped 100 points” as evidence of harm
caused by violation of the FCRA.169
The final set of cases concerns wasted time caused by a defendant’s stat-
utory violation. In TCPA phone cases, courts have granted standing because
plaintiffs wasted time responding to unsolicited calls and texts.170 Likewise,
the Eleventh Circuit identified the time used resolving credit inaccuracies in
an FCRA case171 and time spent destroying a receipt containing credit card
number in a FACTA case as harms.172 These cases either labeled wasted time
as “intangible”173 or made no specific finding regarding tangibility.174 In con-
trast, TCPA fax cases have explicitly classified “wast[ing] the time of [plain-
tiff’s] employees” as a “tangible injury.”175
As this survey of lower court decisions demonstrates, the Supreme
Court’s attempt to clarify concreteness by dividing tangible and intangible
harms was insufficient; the distinction remains blurry. Wasted time seems to
be intangible when not acting as an employee but tangible once a frivolous
fax is answered at work. Additionally, a court can characterize occupation of
a physical object in intangible, tortious terms176 or in terms of tangible
maintenance costs.177 Plaintiffs’ attorneys have cited multiple tangible hooks
to avoid the morass of intangible harms, even by asserting a client’s printer
ink bills or electricity costs. Courts’ comfort with monetary harms produces
some uncomfortable results: a minuscule quantum of electricity consumed
168 . Evans, 889 F.3d at 345 (emphasizing the use of credit reports by landlords and em-
ployers).
169. Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017).
170. Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 648 (N.D. W. Va. 2016); see also
Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. v. Pivotal Payments, Inc., No. 16-cv-05486-JCS, 2017 WL
733123, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017) (“Courts have also recognized that the time that is wast-
ed as a result of TCPA violations constitutes concrete injury.”); Etzel v. Hooters of Am., LLC,
223 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (“[S]urely Plaintiff’s battery was depleted and time
was wasted while reading and responding to the text.”).
171 . Pedro, 868 F.3d at 1280.
172. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The
effort [the plaintiff] put into doing away with the risky receipt would suffice for standing.” (cit-
ing Pedro, 868 F.3d at 1280)).
173 . See, e .g ., Mey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 648 (“A final intangible harm that the illegal calls
caused here is that they required the plaintiff to tend to them and wasted the plaintiff’s time.”).
174 . Muransky, 922 F.3d at 1192; Pedro, 868 F.3d at 1280.
175. Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. MedTox Sci., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 354, 357 & n.1
(D. Minn. 2017); see also A.D. ex rel . Serrano v. Credit One Bank, N.A., No. 14 C 10106, 2016
WL 4417077, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 885 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir.
2018) (referring to “tangible harms like wasted time . . . and financial losses”).
176 . See supra Section III.B.3 (discussing trespass to chattels in the context of TCPA and
intangible harms).
177 . See, e .g ., Florence Endocrine Clinic, PLLC v. Arriva Med., LLC, 858 F.3d 1362, 1366
(11th Cir. 2017).
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receives universal endorsement as a harm while issues of privacy, consumer
deception, and accurate information receive more exacting judicial scrutiny.
D. Risks of Harm
The next category of injuries consists of various risks of harm to plain-
tiffs resulting from statutory violations. Spokeo acknowledged that a “risk of
real harm” can be sufficiently concrete.178 Left unspecified, however, was the
“degree of risk sufficient to meet” that requirement.179 The role of risk in
standing doctrine has been subject to extensive academic examination, par-
ticularly following the Court’s Clapper v . Amnesty International decision.180
This Section will focus on two groups of cases: violations of FACTA that
raise identity theft risks and violations of the FDCPA and TCPA that raise
other miscellaneous risks.
Discussions of risk have played a prominent role in cases arising under
FACTA, which regulates the display of customer credit card information on
receipts.181 Specifically, no “business shall print more than the last 5 digits of
the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the
cardholder.”182
District courts in the Eleventh Circuit have staked out a strict textual po-
sition. In Guarisma v . Microsoft Corp ., the defendant-business printed ten
digits of the plaintiff’s credit card number.183 The court first identified the
purpose of FACTA’s procedural requirements as revealed in the legislative
history, “finding [that] Congress desired to create a substantive legal right
for consumers to utilize in protecting against identity theft.”184 The court
then held that the injury was concrete because “FACTA created a substantive
legal right for . . . consumers to receive printed receipts truncating their per-
sonal credit card numbers, and thus protecting their financial infor-
mation.”185 The court in Wood v . J Choo USA went a step further by granting
standing when the defendant merely printed the card’s expiration date but
178. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
179 . Id . at 1550. In 2013, the Court alternately defined the requisite risk as “certainly im-
pending” and “substantial.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013).
180. 568 U.S. at 415; see, e .g ., Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety:
A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018); Thomas Martecchini, Note, A
Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs: Preserving Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity
Theft After Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1471 (2016).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2012).
182 . Id . § 1681c(g)(1).
183. 209 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
184 . Guarisma, 209 F. Supp. at 1266.
185 . Id . at 1267; see also Altman v. White House Black Mkt., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-2451-SCJ,
2016 WL 3946780, at *6 (N.D. Ga. July 13, 2016) (citing “the Congressional creation of a right
and injury, as well as the language of the Senate Report which indicates that Congress did not
find the risk of identity theft to be speculative”).
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otherwise complied with FACTA’s last-five-digit requirement.186 Finally, in
its 2019 Muransky opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that printing six addi-
tional card digits resulted in a concrete injury.187
Several circuit courts have reached the opposite conclusion.188 In each
case, the FACTA violation at issue was, like in Wood, the printing of a cus-
tomer’s expiration date. In Bassett v . ABM Parking Services, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that “it is difficult to see how issuing a receipt to only the card
owner and with only the expiration date” constitutes a concrete injury, be-
cause the risk of identity theft is simply “too speculative.”189 It rejected the
analogy of an expiration date to historical harms of privacy or defamation.190
More importantly, the court concluded that the judgment of Congress, de-
spite an explicit statutory prohibition, “weigh[ed] against Bassett” because a
later amendment to FACTA clarified that “a disclosed expiration date by it-
self poses minimal risk.”191 The Second and Seventh Circuits reached identi-
cal conclusions, both stressing that (1) an expiration date alone is insufficient
for identity theft and (2) the receipts in question were not disclosed to third
parties.192
This factual distinction—that card digits may facilitate identity theft but
that expiration dates certainly cannot—has produced a slippery slope, in
which other lower courts claim to rely on this distinction to deny standing in
cases arising out of fact patterns increasingly attenuated from Bassett. First,
the Ninth Circuit denied standing to a plaintiff when the defendant in the
case had printed an extra first digit of the plaintiff’s credit card number, not
an expiration date.193 The court claimed to defer to Congress’s expertise but
concluded that, like Bassett, the receipt had not been distributed and that a
card’s first digit is irrelevant information because it “merely identifies the
brand of the card.”194 The next case down the slope, Katz v . Donna Karan
186. Wood v. J Choo USA, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
187. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019). The
court did not determine whether printing an expiration date alone would constitute a concrete
injury. Id . at 1189 n.5.
188. Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018); Crupar-
Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of
De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016).
189 . Bassett, 883 F.3d at 783 (quoting Missouri ex rel . Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 654
(9th Cir. 2017)).
190 . Id . at 780–81 (observing that the receipt was never disclosed to a third party and that
the interests in play do not resemble traditional privacy claims).
191 . Id . at 781–82 (“Congress stressed that ‘proper truncation of the card number . . .
regardless of the inclusion of the expiration date, prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrat-
ing identity theft or credit card fraud.’ ” (quoting the Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarifica-
tion Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565, 1565 (2008))).
192 . Crupar-Weinmann, 861 F.3d at 81–82; Meyers, 843 F.3d at 727–28 (“Congress has
specifically declared that failure to truncate a card’s expiration date, without more, does not
heighten the risk of identity theft.”).
193. Noble v. Nev. Checker Cab Corp., 726 F. App’x 582, 584 (9th Cir. 2018).
194 . Id .
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Co ., denied standing when the defendant printed ten digits of a consumer’s
credit card number.195 Katz relied on the claim, not drawn from Congress,
that ten digits of a credit card are also insufficient to steal the card’s infor-
mation and so cannot cause injury.196
Citing these cases, a district court case that denied standing for a receipt
with the plaintiff’s full credit card number and expiration date marks the
bottom of the slope.197 The court in Jeffries v . Volume Services America con-
cluded that the risk of identity theft was too speculative because no one else
saw the receipt and the plaintiff’s name was not on it.198 To prevent credit
fraud, the court recommended that the plaintiff “simply discard her receipt
in a public trash can.”199 Left out of this analysis is (1) any reference to the
statutory text or congressional findings and (2) any explanation for how Jef-
fries could file a claim after throwing away the only evidence relevant to the
case.
Jeffries epitomizes the tendency of courts in FACTA cases to depart from
explicit statutory language and congressional statements of purpose to con-
strict any plaintiff’s ability to enforce the statute. Taken seriously, Jeffries
renders the cornerstone of a piece of congressional legislation unenforceable
by imposing constitutionally derived “dissemination,” “name,” and “trash
can” requirements. Other court opinions told plaintiffs to “shred” their re-
ceipts.200 In minimizing plaintiffs’ “speculative” identity theft harms, these
courts simultaneously ignore the additional harms of anxiety about identity
theft, time wasted responding to the risk, and costs of shredding.201 In doing
so, these cases create a notable discrepancy with cases arising under the
FDCPA,202 TCPA,203 and FCRA.204
195. 872 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Taylor v. Fred’s, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1247
(N.D. Ala. 2018).
196 . Katz, 872 F.3d at 118, 120.
197. Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 525, 527 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d
and remanded, 928 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
198 . Id . at 531 (“[T]he receipt given to Plaintiff ended up with Plaintiff herself. She could
have lost the receipt, or it could have been stolen . . . . Nor is there any allegation that the re-
ceipt also contained Plaintiff’s name, which presumably would be necessary to make any use of
a credit card number.”).
199 . Id . at 532.
200 . See, e .g ., Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“[Plaintiff] could shred the offending receipt along with any remaining risk of disclosure.”).
201. The Jeffries plaintiff highlighted each of these theories to no avail. Jeffries, 319 F.
Supp. 3d at 530. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit in Muransky emphasized the time and cost bur-
dens from receiving an untruncated receipt. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d
1175, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019).
202 . See Ben-Davies v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 695 F. App’x 674 (4th Cir. 2017) (emo-
tional distress).
203 . See, e .g ., Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641 (N.D. W. Va. 2016) (dis-
cussing, among other harms, wasted time, electricity costs, and occupation of one’s property).
204. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (identify-
ing “reasonably incurred mitigation costs” in responding to increased risk of fraud).
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Ironically, Jeffries and similar opinions also highlight limitations on ju-
dicial factfinding. While these courts claim to closely scrutinize the facts of
each case, they simultaneously appear to rely on outdated or incorrect facts.
As the Eleventh Circuit observed, the claim that the first six digits of a credit
card pose no risk of harm originates in a single expert report filed in a 2007
district court case.205 Subsequent court opinions recycled the finding, despite
the very real possibility that technological developments in the intervening
decade have invalidated the claim.206 Courts, then, have “transformed the
fact-findings of a single district court into a bright-line, no-standing rule.”207
Courts have identified two other risks beyond incremental risk of identi-
ty theft. First, the Sixth Circuit in Macy v . GC Services held that failure to
properly disclose the plaintiff’s rights under the FDCPA caused the harm of
“greater risk of falling victim to ‘abusive debt collection practices.’ ”208 If a
consumer followed the defendant’s faulty instructions, the court reasoned,
they would waive the FDCPA’s protections.209 Second, the district court in
Mey held that unsolicited calls prohibited by the TCPA “cause a risk of inju-
ry due to interruption and distraction.”210 The resulting risk of automobile
accidents, the court held, was a concrete injury.211
This category demonstrates that judges have significant discretion to
frame a harm either as a risk of harm or as a tortious form of harm. For ex-
ample, on remand of Spokeo, the Ninth Circuit analogized Robins’s injury to
defamation, a tort that requires no specific harm.212 But its discussion of
Robins’s reduced employment prospects also appeared to be premised on
probabilities.213 Given these two possible theories, the Ninth Circuit explicit-
ly resisted a risk-based characterization of Robins’s harm.214 The Third Cir-
cuit offers another example of choosing between a tort-based theory and a
risk-based theory of harm. In Horizon Healthcare it chose to base the plain-
205. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2018) (cit-
ing Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 647, 651 (C.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 623 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2010)), vacated, 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019).
206 . Id . at 1214.
207 . Id . at 1213 (citing Tarr v. Burger King Corp., No. 17-23776-CIV-MORENO, 2018
WL 318477 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2018)).
208. Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 758 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692(e) (2012)). The court also framed this as “a risk of harm to the FDCPA’s goal of ensur-
ing that consumers are free from deceptive debt-collection practices.” Id . at 757.
209 . Id . at 758. Notably, the court did not connect such “abusive practices” to any finan-
cial harm. Id .
210. Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 649 (N.D. W. Va. 2016).
211 . Id . (“[A] cell phone call is a common cause of automobile accidents . . . .”).
212. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2017), cert . denied, 138 S.
Ct. 931 (2018).
213 . Id . at 1117.
214 . Id . at 1118 (“[T]his alleged intangible injury is itself sufficiently concrete. It is of no
consequence how likely Robins is to suffer additional concrete harm as well (such as the loss of
a specific job opportunity).”).
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tiff’s standing on a privacy harm rather than the harm of a risk of identity
theft.215
E. Informational Injuries
These last cases concern “informational injuries” that plaintiffs suffer
from statutory violations.216 According to the D.C. Circuit:
A plaintiff suffers sufficiently concrete and particularized informational in-
jury where the plaintiff alleges that: (1) it has been deprived of information
that . . . a statute requires the government or a third party to disclose to it,
and (2) it suffers, by being denied access to that information, the type of
harm Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure.217
Informational injuries have been alleged in post-Spokeo consumer pro-
tection cases with varying levels of success. Primarily, informational injuries
confer standing when defendants fail to disclose a plaintiff’s rights under the
FCRA or FDCPA.218 For example, in Syed v . M-I, LLC, the Ninth Circuit
granted standing because the defendant-employer provided the plaintiff with
a disclosure document that did not “consist ‘solely’ of the disclosure,” a vio-
lation of the FCRA.219 The FCRA disclosure provision furthered Congress’s
“overarching purposes of ensuring accurate credit reporting, promoting effi-
cient error correction, and protecting privacy.”220 But excess information in
the disclosure caused confusion, depriving the plaintiff of the ability to
properly consider the waiver of his rights.221 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in
Macy considered a provision of the FDCPA that requires debt collectors to
215 . In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 634–35 (3d
Cir. 2017). The court observed later in the opinion that “[p]laintiffs make a legitimate argu-
ment that they face an increased risk of future injury, which at least weighs in favor of stand-
ing.” Id . at 639 n.19.
216. Plaintiffs have long enjoyed standing for informational injuries. See, e .g ., Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982).
217. Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (concerning an un-
successful suit for disclosure of information under the ESA).
218. Under the FCRA, “a person may not procure a consumer report . . . for employment
purposes . . . unless . . . a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the con-
sumer . . . before the report is procured . . . in a document that consists solely of the disclosure,
that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). Under the FDCPA:
[A] debt collector shall . . . send the consumer a written notice containing . . . (4) a
statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing . . . that the debt . . .
is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt . . . ; and (5) a state-
ment that, upon the consumer’s written request . . . the debt collector will provide the
consumer with the name and address of the original creditor.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
219. 853 F.3d 492, 498–500 (9th Cir. 2017).
220 . Syed, 853 F.3d at 496–97.
221 . Id . at 499.
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inform consumers of their right to dispute the validity of the debt “in writ-
ing.”222 Though the defendant–debt collector disclosed the plaintiff’s right to
dispute the amount owed, it failed to specify that such complaints must be
written.223 The court granted standing, citing an analogous injury of con-
sumer confusion because a consumer that contested a debt by telephone in-
stead of writing would forfeit the FDCPA’s protections.224 The Second
Circuit drew a dividing line for granting standing under a disclosure provi-
sion of the Truth in Lending Act: a failure to disclose the plaintiff’s obliga-
tions is a concrete injury but a failure to disclose the defendant-lender’s
obligations is not.225
But several circuits have denied standing under similar fact patterns.
First, the Third Circuit in Long denied standing to a plaintiff on the claim
that the defendant-employer failed to disclose, in writing, the plaintiff’s
rights under the FCRA.226 Departing from the Sixth Circuit’s Macy opinion,
the Third Circuit concluded that this failure to disclose caused no injury be-
cause “[p]laintiffs became aware of their FCRA rights and were able to file
this lawsuit.”227 This circular reasoning defeats Congress’s purpose. By this
logic, savvy employers should never disclose an employee’s rights because
employees will either (a) fail to file suit because of their ignorance or (b) be-
come aware of their rights another way and sue, only to be denied standing.
Second, the Seventh Circuit encountered facts very similar to the Ninth
Circuit in Syed.228 In Groshek v . Time Warner Cable, the plaintiff received a
disclosure document that, in violation of the FCRA, did not “consist[] solely
of the disclosure.”229 Here, however, the Seventh Circuit denied standing be-
cause, unlike in Syed, the plaintiff “present[ed] no factual allegations plausi-
bly suggesting that he was confused by the disclosure form.”230
Another informational injury arises when an employer fails to provide
prospective employees with a copy of their credit report before taking ad-
verse employment actions against them.231 Denying information guaranteed
222. Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2018).
223 . Id . at 751.
224 . Id . at 758. The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion under a disclosure pro-
vision and, unlike the Sixth Circuit, explicitly invoked the language of a “right to information
pursuant to the FDCPA.” Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 994 (11th Cir.
2016).
225. Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190, 194 (2d Cir. 2016).
226. Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2018). Under the FCRA,
“before taking any adverse action based . . . on the report, the person intending to take such
adverse action shall provide to the consumer . . . a description in writing of the rights of the
consumer under this subchapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (2012).
227 . Long, 903 F.3d at 325 (“[A]lthough they did not receive FCRA rights disclosures,
they understood their rights sufficiently to be able to bring this lawsuit.”).
228. Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2017).
229 . Id . at 886 (emphasis added).
230 . Id . at 889.
231. Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 699 (7th Cir. 2018).
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by the FCRA causes plaintiffs to suffer the type of harm Congress intended
to prevent—wrongful denial of employment.232 This particular injury is the
subject of the active split between the Third and Ninth Circuits.233 These cir-
cuits disagree over whether a concrete injury has occurred even if providing
a copy of the report could not have changed the plaintiff’s employment out-
come.234
Two final cases arising under different statutes further flesh out standing
for informational injuries. In Hagy v . Demers & Adams, the Sixth Circuit
considered another FDCPA disclosure violation where a letter forgave the
plaintiff’s debt but “ ‘fail[ed] to disclose’ that it was a ‘communication . . .
from a debt collector.’ ”235 Though the letter violated the explicit statute, it
did no harm. In fact, the letter gave the plaintiff “peace of mind,” leading the
court to conclude that the plaintiff had failed to establish standing.236 Finally,
the Eleventh Circuit held that a failure to punctually disclose satisfaction of a
mortgage did not injure the plaintiff because it did not deny him any infor-
mation—he “already kn[ew] that he ha[d] discharged his contractual obliga-
tion.”237 These last two cases underline the importance of the D.C. Circuit’s
second element of an informational injury: the plaintiff must specifically
identify an injury that resulted from the denial of information that they were
statutorily due. That injury is best demonstrated with a counterfactual: if the
plaintiff had known, they would have acted differently.
This taxonomy demonstrates that the Spokeo Court’s attempt to clarify
standing doctrine instead produced confusion and divergence in the lower
courts. While some intangible harms consistently confer standing, others
produce results that vary between courts and between similarly structured
consumer protection statutes.
IV. PROPOSING DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS
This Note contends that courts should aim for uniformity by showing
greater deference to Congress’s articulation of injuries that are sufficient to
confer standing.
The courts and Congress have several sweeping options that would al-
low plaintiffs to establish injury more consistently. Apart from other ac-
tions,238 judicial deference to congressional factfinding should be part of the
232 . Id . at 699.
233 . See supra Part II.
234 . Compare Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 323–24 (3d Cir. 2018), with
Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2018).
235. 882 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012)).
236 . Hagy, 882 F.3d at 621, 623.
237. Nicklaw v. CitiMortage, Inc., 855 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2017).
238. Courts could eliminate the injury-in-fact requirement entirely. See Fletcher, supra
note 3, at 223; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 235–36. Alternatively, courts could return to the pre-
Spokeo ante in which concreteness held little significance and injury in fact was simply a ques-
tion of particularity. See Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. &
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solution. Congress’s “power to define injuries and articulate chains of causa-
tion” has two major advantages when compared to judicial power.239 First,
Congress has superior factfinding abilities in complex environments. Sec-
ond, it is better equipped to adapt to social, political, and technological
change.240
Identifying challenges in society and developing policy responses is the
traditional realm of Congress. As an institution, it is well equipped to con-
sider available evidence, solicit expert advice, and develop prospective re-
sponses to developing challenges.241 The courts, by comparison, have
relatively weak factfinding abilities, as demonstrated in Part III. For one,
courts have treated risk-based harms inconsistently to the point of dismiss-
ing them.242 In the series of post-Spokeo FACTA cases, judges’ intuitions
about likelihood of harm diverged from the judgment of Congress.243 The
Dutta–Long split also cautions against making cut-and-dry risk determina-
tions that depart from Congress’s conclusions.244 Courts should be particu-
larly hesitant about making decisive determinations on the likelihood of any
particular harm occurring in complex environments, like in employer–
employee relationships.245 Though courts should not treat Congress’s identi-
fication of harms as decisive for purposes of standing, they similarly should
not brashly dismiss the benefits of prophylactic procedural requirements.246
Independent of calculating risk, courts may also simply misunderstand
the harms that result from particular statutory violations. Fact-gathering on
standing issues is structurally limited by the fact that it is a jurisdictional in-
MARY L. REV. 2285, 2359–69 (2018). Congress, too, could act either by tying private rights of
action to a cash bounty system or by vesting plaintiffs with a property right to confer a tangible
interest in enforcing statutes. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232–35.
239. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. Daniel Townsend, Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 76, 82–83 (2015).
241 . See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997) (“Congress[] . . . ‘is
far better equipped than the judiciary to “amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data” bearing
upon’ legislative questions. This principle has special significance in cases . . . concerning regu-
latory schemes of inherent complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of indus-
tries undergoing rapid economic and technological change.” (citations omitted) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994))); Note, Judicial Review of Congres-
sional Factfinding, 122 HARV. L. REV. 767, 768 (2008) (“[T]he legislature’s superior capacity to
collect evidence—stemming from its committee system, larger staffs, and research arms—gives
it a comparative advantage over the judiciary in the generalized factfinding that informs legis-
lation.”). But see Neal Devins, Essay, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Re-
view: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1182 (2001).
242 . See supra text accompanying notes 188–200.
243 . See supra Section III.D.
244 . See supra text accompanying notes 97–101.
245 . Cf . In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 640 n.23
(3d Cir. 2017) (“Our conclusion that it was within Congress’s discretion to elevate the disclo-
sure of private information into a concrete injury is strengthened by the difficulty that would
follow from requiring proof of identity theft or some other tangible injury.”).
246 . See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
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quiry and precedes any extensive discovery efforts.247 Notably, the Court it-
self fails to appreciate its narrow factfinding capabilities. One of the most-
cited lines from Spokeo is the Court’s dicta stating that an incorrect zip code
is clearly “a bare procedural violation” resulting in no attendant concrete in-
jury.248 Yet it is not difficult to identify harms that could result from an erro-
neous zip code. For example, research shows that employers discriminate
against job applicants based on the zip codes that appear on their resumes.249
Reporting an incorrect zip code can lead to misdirected mail or even affect
the credit options or prices for services available to consumers.250 After
Spokeo, at least one district court held that reporting an inaccurate address
does cause a concrete injury.251 The Spokeo Court’s judgment reveals a deep-
er failure to appreciate the extent to which “society runs on information, of-
ten through algorithmic calculations,” such that nearly “any inaccuracy
creates a material risk of tangible harm to consumers.”252
Congress is also better positioned to align conceptions of injuries with
cultural, political, and technological change. In FACTA cases, courts have
repeatedly relied on prior case law discounting the risks of identity theft
from the first six digits of a credit card number.253 Yet, as the Eleventh Cir-
cuit observed, the original basis for these claims was a single expert’s opinion
in 2007.254 Since then, hacking and identity theft technology has progressed
significantly.255 Courts have a tendency to convert a contingent factual situa-
tion (like the relative security of a credit card number) into a hard-and-fast
precedent.256 While the very nature of precedent binds subsequent courts,
247 . See Townsend, supra note 240, at 82.
248 . Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550; see, e .g ., Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d
925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016); Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
249. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 991, 1003 (2004).
250 . See Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 52, at 60 n.102; Willis, supra note 41, at 241–42;
see also Wu, supra note 50, at 459 (“[C]ollecting zip codes can lead to consumer privacy harms,
such as receiving unwanted marketing or the sale of personal information to third parties.”).
251 . See Gambles v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 510, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(“[T]he statements in Sterling’s Report about Gambles’s address history together cast him as
itinerant, shiftless, and risky, thereby undermining his prospects for employment.”).
252. Willis, supra note 41, at 242, 250.
253 . See, e .g ., Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2017).
254. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2018) (cit-
ing Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 647, 651 (C.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 623 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2010)), vacated, 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019).
255 . See, e .g ., Bob Sullivan, Identity Theft Is Skyrocketing, and Getting More Sophisticated,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 27, 2018, 10:13 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/identity-
theft-is-skyrocketing-and-getting-more-sophisticated-2018-02-27 [https://perma.cc/A8MW-
WMCB].
256 . Cf . Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 265, 280–81 (observing that
“[c]ommon law rules can become fossilized”); Townsend, supra note 240, at 82.
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Congress can act on the basis of future risks and determine that they are suf-
ficient to justify creation of a private cause of action.257
Statutory causes of action can also adapt to changing values. Because a
single provision can further several interests simultaneously, courts should
be wary of dismissing a plaintiff’s alleged injury by narrowly construing the
values at stake. The Dutta–Long split epitomizes the issue. In Dutta, the
Ninth Circuit focused on the narrow interest of correcting inaccurate credit
reports.258 By comparison, in Long, the Third Circuit emphasized other in-
tangible interests of fairness, transparency, and an opportunity to tell one’s
story independent of any particular pecuniary outcome.259 The Third Cir-
cuit’s approach assigns intrinsic value to procedure and is reminiscent of the
work of Jeremy Waldron. Waldron argues that procedure is valuable not just
for its results but also for its “dignitarian aspect: it conceives of the people
who live under it as bearers of reason and intelligence.”260 The Third Circuit
also likened plaintiffs’ injury to historical conceptions of privacy torts prem-
ised on “interference with an individual’s ability to control his personal in-
formation.”261 This difference in approach not only better fulfills Congress’s
interests as communicated in statutory text but also better subscribes to
Spokeo’s historical considerations.
The Third Circuit’s Long opinion, however, also exhibits a perplexing vi-
sion of informational injuries. Though the court granted plaintiffs standing
under the prior disclosure provision, it denied standing for SEPTA’s failure
to disclose plaintiffs’ rights under the FCRA.262 The court claimed that the
plaintiffs were unharmed by SEPTA’s oversight because they were informed
of their rights by other means—evidenced only by the fact that they success-
fully filed suit against SEPTA.263 This conclusion seems to suggest, however,
that a harm, or lack thereof, caused by a procedural interest can be inferred
purely from the outcome. Such an inference conflicts with the court’s prior
claim that a disclosure requirement is not conditioned “on whether having
the report would allow an individual to stave off an adverse” outcome.264
Like the Ninth Circuit in Dutta, the Third Circuit mistakenly overlooked
other interests that Congress could have been protecting—like the assurance
257 . But see David P. Fidler, The Supreme Court Adapts Constitutional Law to Address
Technological Change, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 11, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/
supreme-court-adapts-constitutional-law-address-technological-change [https://perma.cc/
NR69-EKTC] (“[E]xpecting Congress to keep law in pace with technology is wishful think-
ing.”).
258. Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2018).
259. Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 2018).
260. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in GETTING TO
THE RULE OF LAW 3, 19 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011).
261 . Long, 903 F.3d at 324.
262 . Id . at 325.
263 . Id .
264 . Id . at 319.
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that unsophisticated consumers would not fall victim to deceptive practices
or accidentally forgo their rights.265
There is also reason to believe that a deferential stance would simply
produce more coherent doctrine. Deferring to congressional factfinding
would help resolve three troubling doctrinal trends. First, deference would
reduce the incentive for plaintiffs to launder intangible harms as tangible
harms by seizing on trivial monetary losses.266 For example, consider what
options are left to plaintiffs in Dutta’s position. By narrowing the path for
alleging a pure informational injury, the Ninth Circuit incentivizes standing
arguments that pander to courts’ apparent comfort with pecuniary harms.
As the string of TCPA cases demonstrates, intangible harms are amenable to
being reframed as, often trivial, tangible harms.267 Dutta’s harms, for exam-
ple, could be reframed as (1) the monetary cost of obtaining and printing
one’s own reports, (2) the time and inconvenience of disputing inaccuracies,
not to mention (3) the cost of phone charges and electricity consumed in the
process. Following cases like Mey or Florence Endocrine, these claims should
have traction with lower courts, and would certainly fulfill an apparent de-
sire to tie procedural violations to a tangible injury to the plaintiff. It is diffi-
cult to argue, however, that they would create a more satisfying basis for the
underlying policy concerns that motivated Congress to write the FCRA in
the first place.268
Second, deferring to Congress’s articulation of intangible injuries would
reduce the significance of the tangible–intangible divide altogether. As Ra-
chel Bayefsky argues, “the line between tangible and intangible harm is not a
deep-seated or clear-cut feature of empirical reality, but a contextually sensi-
tive boundary.”269 When judges distinguish between the two, they inevitably
invoke their own normative assumptions as seemingly “obvious” tangible
harms are separated from the more complex intangible ones.270 For example,
courts have disagreed on whether lost time is tangible or intangible in na-
ture.271 Similarly, informational injuries skirt the tangible–intangible divide,
particularly when the information in question could determine a job appli-
cant’s employment.272
Finally, deferring to Congress would produce more consistent out-
comes. Currently, a plaintiff’s fate may hang on a court’s readiness to engage
265 . See Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 758 (6th Cir. 2018).
266 . Cf . Bayefsky, supra note 238, at 2310 (“Some courts have skirted debates about the
cognizability of intangible harm by pointing to a tangible harm that a plaintiff had suffered.”).
267 . See supra Section III.C.
268 . Cf . 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (listing one of the statute’s purposes as ensuring fairness,
confidentiality, and equity, not vindicating trivial harms that attend informational inaccura-
cies).
269. Bayefsky, supra note 238, at 2291.
270 . See id . at 2325, 2359.
271 . See supra Section III.C.
272 . See supra Part II.
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in historical analogy. The outcome in Muransky, for example, differs from
other circuits in large part because the Eleventh Circuit searched for more
apt historical analogies to printing a customer’s credit card information.273
FCRA cases, including the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of Spokeo on remand,
also demonstrate the extent to which outcomes are determined by how a
harm is characterized.274
Ultimately, courts may simply be the wrong forum for determining
which statutory causes of action are truly necessary to shelter individuals
from concrete harms and which are merely superfluous procedural details.
Deference to congressional identification of injuries in procedural rights cas-
es could resemble rational basis review. Under rational basis review, a court
upholds a law so long as there is a rational relationship between the chosen
means and a legitimate interest.275 The law may be wrongheaded or trivial,
but that judgment is for Congress to make, not the courts.276 A court should
conclude that a statutory violation, enforceable by a private right of action,
causes a concrete injury if a rational legislature could have concluded the
procedural right was related to an actionable injury. Standing doctrine could
remain unchanged in other contexts.277 The consumer protection laws high-
lighted in this Note may not be worth the trouble of enforcement, “[b]ut it is
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disad-
vantages” of such policies.278 A deferential stance would produce fairer, more
273 . Compare Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1188–92 (11th Cir.
2019) (analogizing disclosure of the plaintiff’s credit card expiration date to the tort of breach
of confidence), with Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d 776, 780–81 (9th Cir. 2018)
(refusing to identify a cognizable privacy harm because the plaintiff’s receipt was not disclosed
to a third party), and Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76, 81–82 (2d
Cir. 2017) (examining the text of FACTA but not engaging in historical analogies to common-
law privacy claims), and Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 727–28 (7th
Cir. 2016) (considering only the statutory language of FACTA as well as the fact that no third
party viewed the plaintiff’s credit card expiration date). See also Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am.,
Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Rogers, J., concurring in part) (“The vagueness of
the ‘close relationship’ test leaves ample room for a court to reach either conclusion and there-
fore does little to advance the standing analysis here.”).
274 . See supra text accompanying notes 212–215.
275 . See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
276. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469–70 (1981).
277 . See Lee & Ellis, supra note 34, at 225 (“The Court should acknowledge the primacy
of congressional intent and recognize that it may require a different set of standing rules in the
procedural rights context.”). Like equal protection cases, standing could have two tiers with a
more permissive standard when Congress has spoken clearly. See id . at 228.
278 . Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487. For example, some argue that FACTA and the FDCPA
are unfair to defendants. See Michael T. Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and
the Non-Federal Federal Question, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 577, 584–86 (2018). But the proper
remedy for doing away with bad statutes is the electoral process, not the judiciary. Williamson,
348 U.S. at 488. In fact, Congress has already shown a willingness to modify these statutes
when they produce perverse outcomes. See, e .g ., The Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarifica-
tion Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d)
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predictable outcomes for those that Congress saw fit to protect. A court’s
faulty factual reasoning should not stand as a barrier to deserved relief.279
A deferential approach coheres with traditional justifications for stand-
ing doctrine. The most prominent justification for standing is respecting the
separation of powers between branches.280 Yet consumer protection cases do
not raise concerns of asserting general grievances—suits are filed against pri-
vate companies and allege conduct as to particular plaintiffs.281 The executive
branch is neither conscripted into action nor relieved of its Take Care Clause
duties.282 Instead, capricious invalidation of congressional statutes raises far
more pernicious separation-of-powers concerns.283 Courts also should not
strictly construe Spokeo in order to manage caseloads and conserve judicial
resources.284 First, as an empirical matter, predictions of flooding federal
courtrooms with frivolous litigation are difficult to disprove.285 Second, con-
forming an explicitly constitutional doctrine to concern for judicial re-
sources raises important issues of judicial legitimacy.286 Rather, Congress has
authority in such areas of technocratic management and could allocate addi-
tional resources to the judiciary if necessary.287
Nor does greater deference to Congress necessitate abrogating Spokeo.
In part, Spokeo’s holding is narrow in application. The opinion’s open-
textured language, requiring support of history and Congress, does not de-
(2012)) (amending FACTA to include a temporary safe harbor provision for printing expira-
tion dates).
279 . See Bayefsky, supra note 238, at 2315 (“[C]ourts deciding that a statutory violation
poses no material risk of harm override congressional determinations that the likelihood of
real harm was sufficiently grave to justify imposing a procedural requirement. It is unclear why
courts are justified in taking this step.” (footnote omitted)).
280 . See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
281. Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Rogers, J.,
concurring in part) (“FACTA lawsuits do not implicate traditional separation-of-powers con-
cerns.”); Townsend, supra note 240, at 83; see also Sunstein, supra note 3, at 231 & n.300.
282 . See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully execut-
ed . . . .”); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 216–18 (arguing that granting standing to private parties to
challenge executive nonenforcement of laws does not implicate separation-of-powers con-
cerns).
283 . See Bayefsky, supra note 238, at 2355–56; Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing,
61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 n.37, 501 (2008).
284 . Contra Morley, supra note 278, at 597.
285 . See Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litiga-
tion,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 402 (2003) (“[T]he floodgates argument . . . is rarely . . . fol-
lowed by a true analysis of the potential litigation of which it speaks.”). One should also weigh
the benefits of additional actions that could, for example, deter bad actors and protect consum-
ers. See Bayefsky, supra note 238, at 2357–58.
286. Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 127, 177–78 (2014); see also Bayefsky, supra note 238, at 2356–57.
287. Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1069–72
(2013) (noting the range of congressional options to manage judicial caseloads); Sohn, supra
note 23, at 741 (“Congress, after all, is the ultimate guardian and trustee of judicial resources.”).
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mand limiting standing to the extent that some lower courts have.288 On re-
mand, the Ninth Circuit was able to reach its original outcome despite the
Supreme Court’s tightening of concreteness.289 The Third and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, too, have engaged in Spokeo’s two-factor analysis and identified inju-
ries that reflect a pragmatic, dynamic understanding of intangible harms.290
Ultimately, Spokeo’s bare terms may simply exclude standing for statutory
violations that have no rational connection to underlying harm—whether as
defined by history291 or by congressional judgment.292 Where there is room
for reasonable disagreement, a court should defer to Congress. Spokeo’s evi-
dent unmanageability also suggests that lower courts should, faithfully ap-
plying Court precedent, confine its reach.293 Courts should examine history
and congressional judgment, but should not let the opinion’s formalism ob-
struct the application of plain statutes. Finally, if courts cannot practically
defer to Congress’s superior judgment while faithfully following Spokeo, then
the Court should revisit its decision.
CONCLUSION
Application of Spokeo in the lower courts has produced a confused, in-
consistent standing doctrine. Outcomes for plaintiffs currently differ both
across jurisdictions and across similar statutes. Arbitrary doctrine is particu-
larly concerning for the federal system of consumer protection laws that re-
lies on consumers to vindicate their own statutory rights. This Note has
made two contributions. First, it sorted the various intangible harms that
courts have identified in the wake of Spokeo into categories. In doing so, it
highlighted areas of consistency, contradiction, and continued ambiguity.
Second, it called for greater judicial deference to congressional factfinding.
Deferring to Congress’s statutory language would result in both more re-
sponsive and effective enforcement of consumer protection laws as well as a
more coherent standing doctrine for the courts to apply.
288 . See supra text accompanying notes 193–207.
289. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017), cert . denied, 138 S. Ct.
931 (2018).
290 . See Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019); Long v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2018).
291 . See Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding no harm to
plaintiff because a noncompliant letter gave plaintiff “peace of mind”); Nicklaw v. CitiMortage,
Inc., 855 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding no harm because plaintiff was not deprived
of any information as a result of defendant’s violation).
292. A court could conclude, for example, that the TCPA has no rational connection to
car accidents. Contra Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 648–49 (N.D. W. Va.
2016).
293 . See, e .g ., supra Parts II and III.
